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Abstract
In game theory, an Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) is a set of
Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategies that give the same payoffs. Similar
to an Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ES strategy), an ES set is also a
strict NE. This work investigates the evolutionary stability of classical
and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip games. In partic-
ular, we developed an evolutionary game theory model to conduct a
series of simulations where a population of mixed classical strategies
from the ES set of the game were invaded by quantum strategies. We
found that when only one of the two players’ mixed classical strategies
were invaded, the results were different. In one case, due to the in-
terference phenomenon of superposition, quantum strategies provided
more payoff, hence successfully replaced the mixed classical strategies
in the ES set. In the other case, the mixed classical strategies were
able to sustain the invasion of quantum strategies and remained in the
ES set. Moreover, when both players’ mixed classical strategies were
invaded by quantum strategies, a new quantum ES set emerged. The
strategies in the quantum ES set give both players payoff 0, which is
the same as the payoff of the strategies in the mixed classical ES set
of this game.
1 Introduction
Game theory applies probability theory to address uncertainty in the deci-
sion making process. In the classical world, players’ decisions are stored in
classical channels and the information is processed based on classical me-
chanics. With the advent of quantum computing, it is natural to ask if
quantum mechanics would change the dynamics of game playing. To put it
another way, if the decisions are stored in quantum channels, communicated
and processed under quantum mechanics, would a game still produce the
same result?
1
ar
X
iv
:1
21
1.
72
10
v1
  [
qu
an
t-p
h]
  3
0 N
ov
 20
12
In 1999, Meyer [10] explored quantum superposition to play a two-person
zero-sum game: the quantum penny flip game. He reported that due to the
interference phenomenon of superposition, the game that originally has a
Nash Equilibrium (NE) strategy that gives both players equal probability
to win in the classical world has become biased: when the first player is
allowed to use quantum strategies, this player always outperforms the other
player who uses mixed classical strategies. Around the same time, Eisert and
colleagues [2] investigated quantum entanglement in playing the Prisoners’
Dilemma (PD) game. They quantized the game by first entangling two
qubits using a unitary operator (explained in Section 3) that was known to
both players. After that, the two qubits were distributed to the two players
to encode their decisions. Once returned, the two qubits were disentangled
using another unitary operator. Finally, the two qubits were measured and
the results were used to calculate their payoffs. By leveraging quantum
entanglement, the authors reported that the dilemma of the game did not
exist any more. Moreover, the mutual-defection classical NE strategy was
replaced by a quantum NE strategies that gave both players higher payoffs.
Since then, various new development on quantum games have been reported,
such as the quantization1 of the Battle of the Sexes game [8], the Hawk-Dove
game [13], the Monty Hall problem [3] and evolutionary quantum games [7].
Although with higher payoffs, are those quantum NE strategies evolu-
tionarily stable? An NE strategy is evolutionarily stable if a population
of players have adapted the strategy, natural selection alone is sufficient to
prevent it from being invaded by any mutant strategies [9] (more details
in Section 2). Iqbal and Toor [6] were the first to investigate this problem
using the PD game. They reported that when invaded by a group of one-
parameter quantum strategies, the classical mutual-defection NE strategy
remained evolutionarily stable. However, when invaded by a group of two-
parameter quantum strategies, they were no longer stable and were replaced
by a higher-payoff quantum mutual-collaboration strategy. Moreover, the
new dominating mutual-collaboration quantum strategy was evolutionarily
stable against the invasion of any two-parameter quantum strategies.
The objective of this study is to investigate the evolutionary stability
of classical and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip game, which
was introduced by Meyer [10] (see Section 4 for more details). In addition
to deriving analytical results, we are also interested in understanding the
1Quantization here refers to “deriving a quantum version of a classical algorithm”,
which is different from “the process of converting analog to digital signals” that is more
popular in the wider scientific community.
2
dynamics of strategy changes during the game. Evolutionary game theory
(EGT) models [9] are ideal vehicles to provide such insight. In an EGT
model, there is a strategy replication rule, in addition to the game contest-
ing rules. The extra rule specifies how fitter strategies are multiplied and
how less fit strategies are culled out of a population. Games are played
repeatedly for many generations for the dynamics of the strategy changes
in the population to emerge. EGT models have been successfully applied to
analyze strategy changes, the success/failure of a strategy and the existence
of equilibrium strategies in a game [4].
This research developed an EGT model to study the quantum penny
flip game. In particular, we used the model to conduct a series of computer
simulations where a population of mixed classical strategies from the Evolu-
tionarily Stable Set (ES set) of the game were invaded by quantum strategies.
The game has two players where one player has single move while the other
player has two moves. If both players use classical strategies, the two-move
player does not have advantage over the one-move player; the game always
ends with an equilibrium state where both players receive the same payoff
of 0. However, if the two-move player is allowed to use quantum strategies
while the one-move player is not, this is no longer true. Our simulation
results show the following interesting phenomena:
• The two-move player’s mixed classical strategies are not evolutionarily
stable under the invasion of pure quantum strategies, where one par-
ticular kind of quantum strategy gives a higher payoff when playing
against the one-move player’s mixed classical strategies. This result
is identical to that reported in [10]. Moreover, once they become the
dominating strategies in the population, this kind of quantum strate-
gies are evolutionarily stable against the invasion of any classical and
quantum strategies and make the two-move player win the game with
certainty.
• The one-move player’s mixed classical strategies are evolutionarily sta-
ble under the invasion of pure quantum strategies when playing against
the two-move player’s mixed classical strategies. In other words, pure
quantum strategies do not provide advantage over classical strategies
for the one-move player in this game.
• When both players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded by quan-
tum strategies, a new quantum ES set emerged. The strategies in the
quantum ES set give both players payoff 0, which is the same as the
payoff of the strategies in the mixed classical ES set of this game.
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In addition to being the first to investigate evolutionary stability of clas-
sical and quantum strategies in the quantum penny flip game, this work also
made the following novel contributions:
• It proposed and implemented an EGT model to conduct systematic
study of Evolutionarily Stable (ES) strategies for quantum games in
general and the quantum penny flip game in particular (see Section
5).
• It analyzed and interpreted the EGT model simulation results for 3
variations of the quantum penny flip games (see Section 5.1 and Sec-
tion 5.2).
• It identified a quantum ES set where all strategies in the set give both
players payoff 0, which is the same as the payoff of the strategies in
the mixed classical ES set of this game.
This work is significant in the following ways:
• It demonstrates how evolutionary game theory models can advance
our understanding of quantum game theory.
• It demonstrates that even the simple quantum penny flip game has a
rich problem landscape, which could be an inspiration for the investi-
gation of other quantum games using a similar approach.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first explains NE and ES
strategies in two-player symmetric and asymmetric games. After that, their
extension to the Evolutionarily Stable Set (ES set) under evolutionary game
theory models are described. Section 3 gives a brief introduction to quan-
tum information processing. In Section 4, the quantum penny flip game is
described and its mixed classical NE strategies that form the ES set of the
game are analyzed. Section 5 presents our work investigating classical and
quantum ES sets in 3 variations of the game. Finally, Section 6 concludes
the paper and outlines our future work.
2 Nash Equilibrium & Evolutionary Stability
In classical game theory, a profile of all players’ strategies is a Nash Equi-
librium (NE) if none of the players can do better by changing his or her
strategy unilaterally. It is assumed that all players have knowledge of the
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other players’ strategies and are allowed to use that information to maximize
their own payoffs.
In mathematical terms, a strategy profile x∗ = {x∗i } is a NE under the
following condition:
∀i ∈ N, xi ∈ Si, xi 6= x∗i : fi(x∗i , x∗−i) ≥ fi(xi, x∗−i) (1)
where xi is a strategy of player i within his strategy set Si and fi is his payoff
function. Also, x∗−i is a strategy profile of all players except for player i.
Evolutionary stability is a refinement of NE. A NE strategy is an Evo-
lutionarily Stable (ES) strategy if when it is fixed in a population, no al-
ternative (mutant) strategy can invade the population successfully. In a
two-player symmetric game, where both players use identical strategies set
and have identical payoff function, x is an ES strategy under the following
conditions:
f(x, x) > f(y, x), (2)
if f(x, x) = f(y, x) then f(x, y) > f(y, y) (3)
where y is any alternative (mutant) strategy and f is the payoff function of
the game.
In two-player asymmetric games, one population is not sufficient to
model the game. Hofbauer and Sigmund [4] modeled the game using two
populations, where each population contains strategies that belong to one of
the two players to play against each other under two different payoff func-
tions. A pair of strategies (p, q) is an NE pair if the following condition
holds:
∀(x, y) ∈ SA × SB :
fA(p, q) ≥ fA(x, q) and fB(p, q) ≥ fB(p, y); (4)
where SA and SB are the strategy sets for populations A and B respectively;
fA and fB are the payoff functions for strategies in population A and B
respectively.
Moreover, (p, q) is an ES pair under the following condition:
∀x 6= p, y 6= q :
fA(p, q) > fA(x, q) and fB(p, q) > fB(p, y); (5)
Equation 5 is the definition of strict NE. Hence, in two-player asymmetric
games, only strict NE strategies are ES strategies.
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Thomas [17] extended the concept of ES strategies to Evolutionarily
Stable Set (ES set) for games which do not have an ES strategy but have a
continuum of NE strategies that give the same payoffs. These NE strategies
form an ES set, which is a strict NE like an ES strategy for these games.
Thomas showed that under the standard evolution dynamics, if an EGT
model starts with a population that is in the neighborhood of an ES set,
the population would converge towards some of the strategies of the ES
set. In Section 5, we will seed our EGT model with strategies from the
mixed classical ES set and then examine if the population converges to any
strategies of an quantum ES set, if it exists.
In order to apply the concept of ES sets to quantum strategies, we have to
address one important question: “does evolution take place in the quantum
realm?” More precisely, could selection operate on superpositions without
measurement? Could quantum information be mutated and inherited from
one generation to another? According to Quantum Darwinism [18], the an-
swer is “yes”: quantum states are selected against each other in favor of a
stable pointer state. We will give a brief introduction to quantum informa-
tion processing in the following section to pave the way for our investigation
of quantum ES sets.
3 Quantum Information Processing
In classical computing, information is stored in binary 0 or 1. By contrast,
quantum information resides in superpositions of 0 and 1. Quantum infor-
mation processing takes place on these superpositions simultaneously using
unitary operators (explained later). During the process, however, no prob-
ing is allowed to know the intermediate states of the information. This is
because once measured, quantum information collapses into classical value
of 0 or 1. Meanwhile, all superposition information is destroyed. Therefore,
measurement is only performed at the end of the information processing to
obtain the final result.
A quantum bit (qubit) is the counter-part of a classical bit. Using Dirac
notation [1], a qubit is represented as a linear combination of basis states
|0〉 and |1〉:
|ψ〉 = a|0〉+ b|1〉 =
[
a
b
]
, a, b ∈ C (6)
The state of a qubit, hence, is a vector in a two-dimensional complex vector
space. The states |0〉 and |1〉 are computational basis states, which form an
orthonormal basis for this vector space.
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When a qubit is measured, it collapses to |0〉 with probability aa¯2, or to
|1〉 with probability bb¯. Hence, aa¯+ bb¯ = 1.
In addition to the above vector representation, the state of a qubit can
also be formulated using the density matrix [15]:
ρ = |ψ〉〈ψ| (7)
For example, the associated density matrix for |ψ〉 = |0〉 is:
ρ =
[
1
0
] [
1 0
]
=
[
1 0
0 0
]
. (8)
Similarly, the associated density matrix for |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) is:
ρ =
[
1√
2
1√
2
] [
1√
2
1√
2
]
=
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]
. (9)
A mixed quantum state is a linear combination of pure state |ψi〉, each with
probability pi:
ρ =
∑
pi|ψi〉〈ψi|. (10)
For example, the associated density matrix for a mixed quantum state being
in |0〉 and |1〉 with equal probability is:
ρ =
1
2
[
1
0
] [
1 0
]
+
1
2
[
0
1
] [
0 1
]
=
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
. (11)
The transformation of a quantum state to another is through a unitary
operator U , where UU †3 = I:
ρi+1 = UρiU
† (12)
A quantum state can also be transformed by a mix of j unitary operators,
each with probability pj :
ρi+1 =
∑
pjUjρiU
†
j (13)
The trace of a density matrix, ρ, is always 1. The top left corner value,
ρ(1,1), gives the probability of the qubit being measured as |0〉. The bottom
2The a¯ defines complex conjugate of a.
3The † notion defines Hermitian conjugate.
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right corner value, ρ(2,2), gives the probability of the qubit being measured
as |1〉.
For example, the measurement of ρ in Equation (8) produces classical
value 0, while the measurement of ρ in Equations (9) & (11) produces clas-
sical value of 0 and 1 with equal probability. From the measurement point
of view, the two states in Equations (9) & (11) are identical. However, if ρ
is an intermediate state, not to be measured, farther transformation of the
two ρ may lead to different states, hence different final measurements. The
ρ in Equation (9) describes a quantum state as a linear superposition, where
quantum interference may cancel or enhance the probability of the measure-
ment results. By contrast, the ρ in Equation (11) describes a classical state,
where the interference phenomenon does no exist.
The above quantum states and unitary operations can be extended to
multiple qubits using the tensor operator ⊗. However, since the quantum
penny flip game only operates on one qubit, we will not discuss multiple
qubits operations. We refer interested readers to [14].
4 Quantum Penny Flip Games
Meyer [10] quantized the classical Matching Pennies game in the following
ways. Initially, the penny is placed in a closed box head-up. Next, the first
player (Q) is allowed to flip the penny. Next, the second player (Picard) is
allowed to do the same. After that, Q has a second turn to flip the penny
if he wishes. Since the penny flipping is carried out in a closed box, the
intermediate state of the penny is unknown. It is only after Q has made his
second move, the box is opened and the state of the penny is measured. If
the penny is head-up, Q wins. Otherwise, Picard wins. The payoff is 1 for
the winner and -1 for the loser. This is an asymmetric game, because the
two players have a different number of moves and their payoff functions are
different.
As shown in Section 3, both classical and quantum states can be rep-
resented in density matrices, while classical and quantum strategies can be
represented as unitary operators. Using the qubit state |0〉 to represent
head-up and |1〉 to represent tail-up of a penny, the initial head-up state of
the penny is ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
; the classical flip unitary operator is F =
[
0 1
1 0
]
and the classical no-flip unitary operator is N =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
If both Q and Picard use classical strategies, this three-move game has no
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pure classical NE strategies. However, it has a continuum of mixed classical
NE strategies (12 ,
1
2 , *) ∪ (*, 12 , 12): Q flips the penny with probability 12
in one of his two moves and uses an arbitrary strategy in the other move;
Picard flips the penny with probability 12 . The result is a tie, where both
players have equal probability to win the game. In other words, Q does not
have advantage over Picard due to his one extra move.
To understand this continuum of mixed classical NE strategies, we have
to explain two observations. First, the state ρ =
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
is a “stuck state”,
where no classical or quantum strategy can change the state.
In the classical case, let an arbitrary mixed classical strategy have prob-
ability p to flip the penny and probability (1 − p) not to flip the penny
(note that pure strategies are a special case where p = 1 or p = 0). The
strategy transforms ρi =
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
to ρi+1 = pFρiF
† + (1 − p)NρiN † =[
1
2 0
0 12
]
. In the quantum case, let U =
[
a b
b¯ −a¯
]
be an arbitrary pure quan-
tum strategy, which would transform ρi =
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
to ρi+1 = UρiU
† =[
a b
b¯ −a¯
] [
1
2 0
0 12
] [
a¯ b
b¯ −a
]
=
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
.
Second, a mixed classical strategy with p = 12 (half-half) can transform
an arbitrary classical state ρ =
[
s 0
0 1− s
]
to the stuck state
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
as
shown below:
1
2F
[
s 0
0 1− s
]
F † + 12N
[
s 0
0 1− s
]
N † =
[
1
2 0
0 12
]
.
Hence, regardless what classical strategy Q uses in his first move, Picard’s
half-half mixed classical strategy will transform the penny to the stuck state.
Once stuck, Q’s second classical strategy can not change the state to a
different state. The game ends in a tie where both Picard and Q have equal
probability to win the game. Note that one of Q’s two moves has to be
the half-half mixed strategy. Otherwise, Picard can change his half-half
mixed strategy to a different strategy to improve his payoff according to the
non-half-half strategy that Q plays.
The continuum of NE strategies (12 ,
1
2 , *) ∪ (*, 12 , 12) is the classical ES
set for this game. Any classical strategies that is outside this set would give
one of the two players expected payoff that is less than 0. Under selection
pressure, this kind of strategies will become extinct in the population.
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5 Quantum Evolutionarily Stable Sets
Starting with a population of strategies from the mixed classical ES set,
we design the following three mutant invasion simulations to investigate the
existence of quantum ES set in the quantum penny flip games:
1. Q’s mixed classical strategies in the ES set are invaded by pure quan-
tum strategies to play against Picard’s mixed classical strategies in the
ES set;
2. Picard’s mixed classical strategies in the ES set are invaded by pure
quantum strategies to play against Q’s mixed classical strategies in
the ES set;
3. Q’s mixed classical strategies in the ES set are invaded by pure quan-
tum strategies while Picard’s mixed classical strategies in the ES set
are invaded by mixed two quantum strategies to play against each
other.
We designed our EGT model based on the evolutionary framework de-
scribed by Hofbauer and Sigmund [4] to conduct the designed simulations.
In this model, there are two populations P and K, one for Picard’s and
one for Q’s strategies. At each generation, every p ∈ P plays against every
k ∈ K. At each contest, the payoff of p is the probability of the penny’s
final state (ρfinal) being measured as |1〉 minus the probability of it being
measured as |0〉. By contrast, the payoff of k is the probability of ρfinal be-
ing measured as |0〉 minus the probability of it being measured as |1〉. The
fitness of p is the average payoff of its contests against all k ∈ K. Similarly,
the fitness of k is the average payoff of its contests against all p ∈ P .
f(p) =
∑
k∈K fP (p, k)
|K| , fP (p, k) = ρfinal(1, 1)− ρfinal(0, 0) (14)
f(k) =
∑
p∈P fK(p, k)
|P | , fK(p, k) = ρfinal(0, 0)− ρfinal(1, 1) (15)
We used the following two-parameter unitary operator to represent a quan-
tum strategy:
U(θ, φ) =
[
cosθ −eiφsinθ
sinθ eiφcosθ
]
.
where θ ∈ [0, pi2 ] and φ ∈ [0, pi]. The classical flip strategy F is U(pi2 , pi) =[
0 1
1 0
]
. The classical no-flip strategy N is U(0, 0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
.
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We implemented the EGT model using Holland’s Genetic Algorithms
(GAs) [5]. An individual is a linear chromosome that consists of a number
of genes. To encode a mixed classical strategy, the gene is the probability
(pro) to flip the penny. To encode a pure quantum strategy U , the genes
are the values of θ and φ. Encoding a mixed-two quantum strategy requires
5 gene values: the probability of applying the first quantum strategy, the θ
and φ of the first quantum strategy and the θ and φ of the second quantum
strategy.
The half-half mixed strategy can be coded in two different ways: p = 0.5
or U(pi4 , ∗), where * is a random value between 0 and pi. This is because when
applied to an arbitrary classical state ρi =
[
s 0
0 1− s
]
, U(pi4 , ∗) produces the
same effect as the half-half mixed classical strategy on the diagonal elements:
ρi+1 = U(
pi
4 , ∗)
[
s 0
0 1− s
]
U(pi4 , ∗)† =
[
1
2 s− 12
s− 12 12
]
.
When measured, the penny collapses to |0〉 and |1〉 with equal probability.
Note that ρi+1 is not the same as the “stuck state”, since its off-diagonal
values are not zero. If ρi+1 is an intermediate state of the penny, quantum
strategies can change the state although classical strategies cannot. Hence,
the final measurement of the penny may not be a tie. However, in simula-
tions 1 & 2, one of the two players remains using classical strategies, which
can not modify ρi+1. The U(
pi
4 ,*) strategy, therefore, behaves identical to
the classical half-half mixed strategy.
The system uses the following standard GA operators:
• Binary tournament selection: two chromosomes are randomly selected
from a population and the one with higher fitness is the winner.
• Gaussian mutation: each gene value of a selected chromosome has a
specified probability to be mutated by adding random values from a
Gaussian distribution under a specified standard deviation to produce
a new offspring.
• Average crossover: the genes of two selected chromosomes are averaged
to produce one offspring.
Figure 5 gives the GA system workflow. Initially, two populations, P and
K, are seeded with classical strategies from the ES set. The two populations
of strategies then play against each other and their fitness values are evalu-
ated according to equations 14 & 15. Based on the fitness, fitter strategies
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are selected to perform average crossover and Gaussian mutation to produce
offspring for the next generation. This process of selection-reproduction-
evaluation is repeated for many generations until the maximum number of
generation is reached.
 
Begin	  GA	  	   g:=0	  {	  generation	  counter	  }	  	   Initialize	  population	  P(g)	  	   Initialize	  population	  K(g)	  	   Play	  each	  p	  in	  P(g)	  against	  each	  k	  in	  K(g)	  	  	   {compute	  fitness	  values}	  	   While	  g	  <	  max_gen	  do	  	   	   g:=g+1	  	  	   	   While	  the	  size	  of	  P(g)	  <	  pop_size	  	   	   	   Apply	  Binary	  Tournament	  Selection	  twice	  to	  	  	   	   	   	   chose	  two	  winners	  from	  P(g-­‐1)	  	   	   	   Perform	  average	  crossover	  on	  the	  two	  winners	  	   	   	   	   to	  produce	  one	  offspring	  	  	   	   	   If	  (rnd()<mutation_rate)	  	   	   	   	   Perform	  Gaussian	  mutation	  on	  the	  offspring	  	  	   	   	   Add	  the	  offspring	  to	  P(g)	  	  	   	   End	  while	  	   	   While	  the	  size	  of	  K(g)	  <	  pop_size	  	   	   	   Apply	  Binary	  Tournament	  Selection	  twice	  to	  	  	   	   	   	   chose	  two	  winners	  from	  K(g-­‐1)	  	   	   	   Perform	  average	  crossover	  on	  the	  two	  winners	  	   	   	   	   to	  produce	  one	  offspring	  	   	   	   If	  (rnd()<mutation_rate)	  	   	   	   	   Perform	  Gaussian	  mutation	  on	  the	  offspring	  	   	   	   Add	  the	  offspring	  to	  K(g)	  	  	   	   End	  while	  	   	   Play	  each	  p	  in	  P(g)	  against	  each	  k	  in	  K(g)	  	   	   {compute	  fitness	  values}	  	   End	  while	  End	  GA	  
Figure 1: The genetic algorithm system work flow.
Table 1 lists the GA parameters used to run the simulations. The max-
imum number of generation is 500 for simulations 1 & 2 and 10,000 for
simulation 3. We present simulation 1 & 2 and their results in the following
subsection. In Section 5.2, we present and analyze the results of simulation
3.
Table 1: GA Parameter values to run the simulations.
parameter value parameter value
pop size 50 max gen 500/10,000
mutation rate 20% Gaussian mutation std 0.2
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5.1 Quantum Strategies Invade One of the Two Players’
Classical Strategies
As analyzed in Section 4, the game has a mixed classical ES set (12 ,
1
2 , ∗) ∪
(∗, 12 , 12). We encode the half-half strategy as U(pi4 , ∗) in the population that
is to be invaded by quantum strategies, which can be population P or K,
hence any U(θ 6= pi4 , ∗) is a quantum mutant strategy. By contrast, the half-
half strategy in the population that is not invaded by quantum strategies,
which can be population P or K, is coded as pro = 12 . In this way, the pro
can be mutated to any probability to adapt to the invasion that is taking
place in the other population (see the work flow in Figure 5).
5.1.1 Simulation 1:
In this simulation, K is invaded. The initial K population is therefore seeded
with each k ∈ K having two unitary operators U1 and U2, one for each of
its two moves, as U(pi4 , ∗) and U(∗, ∗), where * is a value randomly chosen
such that 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi2 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi. By contrast, all p ∈ P are identical
with pro = 0.5. We made 100 simulation runs and the population average
fitness with the standard error of the mean (SEM) are given in Figure 2.
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Figure 3: P and K strategies con-
tents.
At generation 0, both populations were seeded with mixed classical
strategies from the ES set, hence all individuals received payoff 0. Once
some of the U in the K population and some of the pro in the P population
were mutated, the average fitness of the K population increased very quickly,
while the average fitness of the P population dropped very quickly. At gen-
eration 400, the average fitness of both populations converged, where all
quantum strategies in the K population received fitness close to 1 (0.9999)
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while all mixed classical strategies in the P population received fitness close
to -1 (-0.9999).
Figure 3 shows the evolved strategies in both populations. For the K
population, they are the average θ and φ of U1 and U2 with the SEM. For
the P population, they are the average pro with the SEM.
At generation 0, the K population consisted of two types of individuals:
[U(pi4 , ∗), U(∗, ∗)] and [U(∗, ∗), U(pi4 , ∗)], where * is a randomly generated
value that satisfies the constraints, 0 ≤ θ ≤ pi2 and 0 ≤ φ ≤ pi. All pro in
the P population, on the other hand, are 0.5.
After the evolution started, the average θ of the two quantum strategies
U1 and U2 in the K population remained as pi4 while the average φ of U1
stayed around pi2 but with a large standard error. By contrast, the average
φ of U2 grew and converged to pi around generation 400. Meanwhile, the
average pro of the P population fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.6, but did not
converge to a particular value.
We analyze the penny states using the evolved strategy [U(pi4 , ∗), pro, U(pi4 , pi)].
Given the head-up state, ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, the state of the penny after Q
applied U(pi4 , ∗) is ρ1 = U(pi4 , ∗)ρ0U(pi4 , ∗)† =
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]
. Next, Picard ap-
plied his mixed classical strategy (pro) to transform the penny state to
ρ2 = proFρ1F
† + (1 − pro)Nρ1N † =
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]
, which is identical to ρ1. In
other words, Picard’s mixed classical strategy could not change the state of
the penny. Since all pro values produce the same ρ2, the pro in P popu-
lation had a wide range between 0 and 1 with average around 0.4 and 0.6,
as that shown in Figure 3. Note that unlike the “stuck state”, the phase
(non-diagonal value) of ρ2 is not zero. Although classical strategies cannot
change the state, quantum strategies can modify the phase and through the
effect of interference (see Section 3), the state of the penny may change.
If both players had only one move, the game would have ended and both
players received the same payoff of 0. However, this is not the case, as
Q had one more move. He then applied U(pi4 , pi), whose interference effect
changed the state to: ρ3 = U(
pi
4 , pi)ρ2U(
pi
4 , pi)
† =
[
1 0
0 0
]
. When measured,
the penny collapses to |0〉 with probability 1. The game therefore ended
with Q receiving payoff 1 and Picard receiving payoff -1. While the extra
move did not give Q advantage in the classical version of the game, it helped
him to win in this version of quantum penny flip game with certainty.
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Why did the φ of U1 have such a large standard error? Given the
initial head-up state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, the state of penny after applying an
arbitrary strategy U(θ, φ) =
[
cosθ −eiφsinθ
sinθ eiφcosθ
]
is: ρ1 = U(θ, φ)ρ0U(θ, φ)
† =[
cosθ −eiφsinθ
sinθ eiφcosθ
] [
1 0
0 1
] [
cosθ sinθ
−e−iφsinθ e−iφcosθ
]
=
[
cosθ2 sinθcosθ
sinθcosθ sinθ2
]
.
In other words, φ of U1 has no impact on ρ1. Since all U(
pi
4 ,*) would produce
ρ1 =
[
1
2
1
2
1
2
1
2
]
, the φ can be any value between 0 and pi. Consequently, they
average to pi2 with a large standard error as that shown in Figure 3.
The set of strategy pairs [U(pi4 , ∗), U(pi4 , pi)] are the winning quantum
strategies for Q, regardless what mixed classical strategies Picard uses.
Moreover, any [U(θ 6= pi4 , ∗), U(θ 6= pi4 , φ 6= pi)] would give Q a lower payoff.
The continuum of [U(pi4 , ∗), ∗, U(pi4 , pi)] is therefore the ES set for this version
of the quantum penny flip game.
5.1.2 Simulation 2:
In this simulation, P is invaded. The initial P population is therefore seeded
with each p as the unitary operator U(pi4 , ∗), where * is a random value
between 0 and pi. By contrast, the K population is seeded with each k as
either [pro1 = 0.5, pro2 = ∗] or [pro1 = ∗, pro2 = 0.5], where * is a random
value between 0 and 1. We made 100 simulation runs and the results are
presented in Figure 4 and Figure 5.
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Figure 4: P and K avg population
fitnesses.
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Figure 5: P and K strategies con-
tents.
Figure 4 shows that during the entire simulation of 500 generations, the
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average fitness for both populations stayed close to 0. Figure 5 shows that
the dominating strategy in the P population converged to U(pi4 ,
pi
2 ) while the
average pro1 and pro2 in the K population fluctuated between 0.4 and 0.6
but did not converge to a particular value.
To analyze the ES set for this version of quantum penny flip game, we
evaluate the penny states under the three evolved operations [pro1 ,U(
pi
4 ,
pi
2 ),
pro2]. With initial state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, after Q applied his mixed classical
strategy pro1, the state of the penny is ρ1 = pro1Fρ0F
†+(1−pro1)Nρ0N † =[
pro1 0
0 1− pro1
]
. Next, Picard’s U(pi4 ,
pi
2 ) would transform the state to ρ2 =
U(pi4 , 0)ρ1U(
pi
4 , 0)
† = 12
[
1 2pro1 − 1
2pro1 − 1 1
]
. In fact, Picard can use any
U(pi4 , ∗) to transform the penny to the same state, since φ has no impact on
the state transformation. We have examined the P population and found
that the φ values spread between 0 and pi, hence averaged to pi2 . With all
100 simulation runs having average φ ≈ pi2 , their average is also close to pi2
with a small standard error, as that shown in Figure 5.
Finally, Q applied his second mixed classical strategy pro2 to transform
the penny to ρ3 = pro2Fρ2F
†+(1−pro2)Nρ2N † = 12
[
1 2pro1 − 1
2pro1 − 1 1
]
,
which is identical to ρ2. Once measured, the penny collapsed to |0〉 and |1〉
with equal probability, hence both players received expected payoff 0. Since
neither pro1 nor pro2 has impact on final state, hence the measurement re-
sult, their values can have a wide range between 0 and 1. Consequently,
their averages are around 0.4 and 0.6, as that shown in Figure 5.
This result is similar to the classical version of the game in that no
matter what mixed classical strategies Q used in his first move, Picard’s
U(pi4 , ∗) half-half strategy will transform the penny to a stuck state, where
Q’s second classical strategy could not change the state to other state. The
quantum version of the game therefore has the same ES set as that of the
classical version of the game: [12 , U(
pi
4 , ∗), ∗] ∪ [∗, U(pi4 , ∗), 12 ].
Classical strategies are a proper subset of quantum strategies. The ES
set in the classical version of a game therefore does not need to be the ES
set in the quantum version of the game. This is the case in simulation 1
where the mixed classical strategies in the ES set are replaced by quantum
strategies in that version of quantum game. However, in simulation 2, the
mixed classical ES set remain as the ES set in this version of quantum game.
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5.2 Quantum Strategies Invade Both Players’ Classical Strate-
gies
In this simulation, the mixed classical strategies in the K population are in-
vaded by pure quantum strategies, while the mixed classical strategies in the
P population are invaded by mixed-two quantum strategies. We designed
this simulation as an extension of simulation 1 to explore whether mixed-
two quantum strategies can provide better payoff than mixed-two classical
strategies for Picard when playing against Q’s pure quantum strategies.
Similar to simulation 1, the initial K population is seeded with two types
of individuals: [U(pi4 ,*), U(*,*)] and [U(*,*), U(
pi
4 , *)]. Unlike simulation 1,
all p ∈ P in this simulation are [pro = 0.5, U(pi2 , pi), U(0, 0)], where U(pi2 , pi) =[
0 1
1 0
]
is the classical flip strategy and U(0, 0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
is the classical no-
flip strategy. In this way, the quantum strategies in both populations can
evolve against each other to improve their payoffs. We made 100 simulation
runs and the average population fitness with the SEM are presented in Figure
6.
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Figure 6: P and K population average fitness.
Similar to the two previous simulations, both populations had the same
initial average fitness of 0. However, once evolution started, the average
fitness of K population increased while the average fitness of P population
decreased. This trend continued until generation 800 when the trend is
reversed: the average fitness of P population grew while the average fitness
of K population shrank. Around generation 4,000, the average fitness of both
populations converged to 0, indicating all strategies in both populations give
equal probability to win the game.
Compared to the two previous simulations, the populations in this sim-
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ulation took 4 times longer to converge. This is because the number of
strategy parameters in this simulation (Q has 4 parameters while Picard
has 5 parameters) is larger than that in the two previous simulations (Q
has 4 or 2 parameters while Picard has 1 or 2 parameters). With a larger
parameters space, it took evolution longer to find the stable strategies for
this version of quantum penny flip game.
To understand the dynamics of strategies changes during the game, we
examined the 100 evolved quantum strategies in both populations. We
found that they can be grouped into 4 categories as shown in Table 2. The
descriptions of these quantum strategies are given in Table 3. Note that
σ1, σ2, σ3 are Pauli matrices. We represent σ2 as
[
0 −1
1 0
]
, which behaves
identical to
[
0 −i
i 0
]
when applied to an arbitrary state ρ =
[
s a
a¯ 1− s
]
:[
0 −1
1 0
] [
s a
a¯ 1− s
] [
0 −1
1 0
]†
=
[
0 −i
i 0
] [
s a
a¯ 1− s
] [
0 −i
i 0
]†
=
[
1− s −a¯
−a s
]
.
Table 2: Four categories of the evolved quantum strategies.
category Q’s pure quantum strategies Picard’s mixed quantum strategies qty
1 U1=U(pi4 ,*), U2=U(*,
pi
2 ) mixed σ1 and σ3 43
2 U1=U(pi4 ,*), U2=U(*,
pi
2 ) mixed σ2 and I 53
3 U1=U(0,*), U2=H mixed σ3 and σ2 3
4 U1=U(pi2 ,*), U2=U(
pi
4 ,0) mixed I and σ1 1
Table 3: Descriptions of the evolved quantum strategies.
strategy unitary matrix
σ1 U(
pi
2 , pi) =
[
0 1
1 0
]
σ2 U(
pi
2 , 0) =
[
0 −1
1 0
]
σ3 U(0, pi) =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
I U(0, 0) =
[
1 0
0 1
]
Hadamard(H) U(pi4 , pi) =
1√
2
[
1 1
1 −1
]
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For each of the 4 categories, we analyze the evolved quantum strategies
in the following subsections.
5.2.1 Category 1 Quantum Strategies:
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Figure 7: Evolved Q strategies
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y
an
gl
e
generation
P pop avg U1 e
P pop avg U1 q
P pop avg U2 e
P pop avg U2 q
P pop avg pro
Figure 8: Evolved Picard strategies.
Among the 100 simulation runs, 43 of them converged to strategies in
category 1, where Q used U(pi4 ,*) and U(*,
pi
2 ) to play against Picard’s
mixed σ1 and σ3 strategies. As analyzed in simulation 1, φ of U1 does
not have impact on ρ1. Q could therefore apply any U(
pi
4 ,*) to transform
the initial state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
to ρ1 = U(
pi
4 , ∗)
[
1 0
0 0
]
U(pi4 , ∗)† = 12
[
1 1
1 1
]
.
Next, Picard applied mixed σ1 and σ3 to transform the penny to ρ2 =
(pro)σ1ρ1σ
†
1 +(1−pro)σ3ρ1σ†3 = 12
[
1 2pro− 1
2pro− 1 1
]
. Finally, Q applied
U(*,pi2 ) and transformed the penny to ρ3 = U(∗, pi2 )ρ2U(∗, pi2 )† = 12
[
1 a
a¯ 1
]
.
When measured, the penny collapses to |0〉 and to |1〉 with equal probability,
hence both players received expected payoff 0.
Note that θ of Q’s U2 has no impact on the final state ρ3, hence the mea-
surement of the penny. This is because given an arbitrary strategy U(θ, φ) =[
cosθ −eiφsinθ
sinθ eiφcosθ
]
, the state ρ3 = U(θ, φ)ρ2U(θ, φ)
† =
[
cosθ −eiφsinθ
sinθ eiφcosθ
]
1
2[
1 2pro− 1
2pro− 1 1
] [
cosθ sinθ
−e−iφsinθ e−iφcosθ
]
= 12
[
sinθ2 + cosθ2 a
a¯ sinθ2 + cosθ2
]
= 12
[
1 a
a¯ 1
]
. Since all U(*,pi2 ) produce the ρ3 that give the same measure-
ment result, θ of U2 can be any value between 0 and pi2 . In our simulation
runs, θ of U2 averaged to pi3 (see Figure 7). Similarly, Picard’s pro also does
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not have impact on ρ3. Figure 8 shows that Its values frustrated between 0
and 1 and averaged to between 0.4 and 0.6.
5.2.2 Category 2 Quantum Strategies:
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Figure 9: Evolved Q strategies
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Figure 10: Evolved Picard strategies.
53 of the 100 simulation runs converged to strategies in category 2, where
Q used U(pi4 ,*) and U(*,
pi
2 ) to play against Picard’s mixed σ2 and I. With the
initial state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, after Q applied U(pi4 , *), the state of the penny was
ρ1 = U(
pi
4 , ∗)
[
1 0
0 0
]
U(pi4 , ∗)† = 12
[
1 1
1 1
]
. Next, Picard applied mixed σ2
and I, which transformed the penny to ρ2 = (pro)σ2ρ1σ
†
2 +(1−pro)Iρ1I† =
1
2
[
1 1− 2pro
1− 2pro 1
]
. Finally, Q applied U(*,pi2 ) and transformed the
penny to ρ3 = U(∗, pi2 )ρ2U(∗, pi2 )† = 12
[
1 a
a¯ 1
]
. When measured, the penny
collapsed to |0〉 and to |1〉 with equal probability, hence both players received
expected payoff 0.
Similar to the strategies in category 1, both φ of Q’s U1 and θ of Q’s
U2 have no impact on the penny’s final state ρ3. Figure 9 shows that their
values have a wide range and averaged to pi2 and
pi
3 . Similarly, Picard’s
pro has no impact on the penny’s final state. Figure 10 shows its values
fluctuated between 0 and 1, with an average between 0.4 and 0.6.
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Figure 11: Evolved Q strategies
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Figure 12: Evolved Picard strategies.
5.2.3 Category 3 Quantum Strategies:
3 of the 100 simulation runs converged to strategies in category 3, where Q
uses U(0, *) and Hadamard to play against Picard’s mixed σ3 and σ2 strate-
gies. With the initial state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, after Q applied U(0, *), the state
of the penny remained the same: ρ1 = U(0, ∗)
[
1 0
0 0
]
U(0, ∗)† =
[
1 0
0 0
]
.
Next, Picard applied mixed σ3 and σ2, which transformed the penny to
ρ2 = (pro)σ3ρ1σ
†
3 + (1 − pro)σ2ρ1σ†2 =
[
pro 0
0 1− pro
]
. Finally, Q applied
Hadamard and transformed the penny to ρ3 = Hρ2H
† = 12
[
1 2pro− 1
2pro− 1 1
]
.
When measured, the penny collapsed to |0〉 and to |1〉 with equal probability,
hence both players received expected payoff 0.
Similar to the strategies in the two previous categories, φ of Q’s U1
and pro of Picard’s mixing probability have no impact on the penny’s final
state. As a result, they did not converge to a particular value. However,
their standard errors are much lager than that of the strategies in the two
previous categories, because they are averaged over 3 runs, instead of a
larger number of simulation runs.
5.2.4 Category 4 Quantum Strategies:
Only 1 out of the 100 simulation runs converged to strategies in cate-
gory 4, where Q used U(pi2 ,*) and U(
pi
4 ,0) to play against Picard’s mixed
I and σ1 strategies. With the initial state ρ0 =
[
1 0
0 0
]
, after Q applied
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Figure 13: Evolved Q strategies
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 0  2000 4000 6000 8000 10000
 0
 20
 40
 60
 80
 100
 120
 140
 160
 180
pr
ob
ab
il
it
y
an
gl
e
generation
P pop avg U1 e
P pop avg U1 q
P pop avg U2 e
P pop avg U2 q
P pop avg pro
Figure 14: Evolved Picard strategies.
U(pi2 , *), the state of the penny is ρ1 = U(
pi
2 , ∗)
[
1 0
0 0
]
U(pi2 , ∗)† =
[
0 0
0 1
]
.
Next, Picard applied mixed I and σ1 strategies to transform the penny
to ρ2 = (pro)Iρ1I
† + (1 − pro)σ1ρ1σ†1 =
[
1− pro 0
0 pro
]
. Finally, Q ap-
plied U(pi4 ,0) which transformed the penny to ρ3 = U(
pi
4 , 0)ρ2U(
pi
4 , 0)
† =
1
2
[
1 1− 2pro
1− 2pro 1
]
. When measured, the penny collapses to |0〉 and
to |1〉 with equal probability, hence both players receive expected payoff 0.
Similar to the strategies in the previous three categories, φ of Q’s U1 and
pro of Picard’s mixing probability have no impact on the penny’s final state.
Therefore, they did not converge to a particular value.
5.2.5 Discussion
Categories 1 and 2 strategies are NE because neither of the two players can
change his strategy alone to improve his payoff. However, this is not the
case categories 3 and 4 strategies. For example, instead of using U(0,*) and
H to force a tie, Q can use U(pi4 , *) and U(
pi
4 , 0) to beat Picard’s mixed
σ3 and σ2. However, if Q play that strategy, Picard can use the mixed I
and σ1 strategies to beat Q. Then if Picard use that strategy, Q has another
winning strategy U(pi4 ,*) and H that can beat Picard and win the game. But
if Q use that strategy, Picard can use mixed σ3 and σ2 to beat Q. This loops
back to our starting point where Q has a winning strategy U(pi4 ,*) and U(
pi
4 ,
0) to beat Picards mixed σ3 and σ2.
This circular competition relationship among Q and Picard’s winning
strategies seems to suggest that there is no equilibrium strategies to settle
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those winning strategies. However, under the competitive co-evolution of the
EGT model, where both P and K populations are allowed to continuously
evolve new strategies to play against the new strategies evolved by the other
player, a new set of compromised strategies emerged. The strategies in cat-
egories 3 and 4 are able to play against the other player’s winning strategies
and force a tie. Together, the four categories of quantum strategies form
the ES set of this version of the quantum penny flip game.
Compared to simulation 1, where Picard’s mixed-two classical strategies
in the ES set were not able to change the state of the penny transformed by
Q’s quantum strategy, hence lost the game every time, in this simulation,
the mixed-two quantum strategies in the ES set allowed Picard to always
force a tie. In other words, quantum strategies have benefited Picard in this
version of the quantum penny flip game.
6 Concluding Remarks
Classical game theory is a mature science that is frequently applied to an-
alyze conflicts that arise during decision making in economics and social
sciences. With the recent development of quantum information processing,
many classical games have been quantized to investigate the game dynamics
under the influence of quantum mechanics. However, there has not been
work applying evolutionary game theory (EGT) models to investigate quan-
tum game theory. This work proposed and developed an EGT model to
investigate the quantum penny flip games. In particular, we used the model
to conduct a series of simulations where a population of mixed classical
strategies from the ES set of the game were invaded by quantum strategies.
The results of our investigation are very encouraging.
First, we found that when only one of the two players’ mixed classical
strategies were invaded, the results were different. In one case, due to the in-
terference phenomenon of superposition, quantum strategies provided more
payoff, hence successfully replaced the mixed classical strategies in the ES
set. In the other case, the mixed classical strategies were able to sustain the
invasion of quantum strategies and remained in the ES set. Secondly, when
both players’ mixed classical strategies were invaded by quantum strategies,
a new quantum ES set emerged. The strategies in the quantum ES set give
both players payoff 0, which is the same as the payoff of the strategies in
the mixed classical ES set of this game.
With the established EGT framework, we will continue our investigation
of mixed quantum ES set in the quantum penny flip game. In particular,
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we will increase the number of quantum strategies used by each player to
identify other quantum ES sets in this game [11]. We are also interested in
applying the developed methodology to study other quantum games.
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